Knowledge and the norms of assertion

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638 (2009)
Abstract
An account of the norms of assertion is proposed which is supported by the same considerations that motivate the familiar knowledge account of those norms, but does not have a problematic consequence of the latter. This alternative account is defended against others to be found in the literature, and some larger epistemological issues it raises are considered briefly
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1991). Epistemic Possibilities. Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Keith DeRose (1996). Knowledge, Assertion and Lotteries. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):568 – 580.

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