Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381 (2006)
|Abstract||The interpretation of transcendental arguments remains a contentious issue for contemporary epistemology. It is usually agreed that they originated in Kant's theoretical philosophy and were intended to have some kind of anti-sceptical efficacy. I argue that the sceptic with whom Kant was concerned has been consistently misidentified. The actual sceptic was Hume, questioning whether the faculty of reason can justify any of our judgements whatsoever. His challenge is a sceptical argument regarding rule-following which engenders a vicious regress. Once this sceptical threat is properly identified, the prospects of transcendental arguments must be re-evaluated.|
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