Knowing through the body

Philosophical Psychology 4 (1):3-18 (1991)
Abstract
Abstract Recent empirical studies of categorization, concept development, semantic structure, and reasoning reveal the inadequacies of all theories that regard knowledge as static, propositional, and sentential. These studies show that conceptual structure and reason are grounded in patterns of bodily experience. Structures of our spatial/temporal orientations, perceptual interactions, and motor programs provide an imaginative basis for our knowledge of, and reasoning about, more abstract domains. Such a view transcends both foundationalism and extreme relativism or scepticism
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (2010). What Metaphors Mean. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 31.

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