Non-reductionism and special concern

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657 (2007)
Abstract
The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ken Akiba (2000). Identity Is Simple. American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (4):389 - 404.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Jens Johansson (2010). Parfit on Fission. Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35.
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