David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 2010 (150):21 - 35 (2010)
Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit's defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am
|Keywords||Personal identity Parfit Fission What matters|
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References found in this work BETA
Derek Parfit (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press.
Derek Parfit (1971). Personal Identity. Philosophical Review 80 (January):3-27.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.
Peter K. Unger (1990). Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford University Press.
Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Jacob Ross (2014). Divided We Fall. Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.
Douglas Ehring (2013). Why Parfit Did Not Go Far Enough. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):133-149.
Christopher T. Buford (2013). Does Indeterminacy Matter? Theoria 79 (2):155-166.
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