Proof of the Existence of Universals—and Roman Ingarden's Ontology

Metaphysica 10 (1):65-87 (2009)
Abstract
The paper ends with an argument that says: necessarily, if there are finitely spatially extended particulars, then there are monadic universals. Before that, in order to characterize the distinction between particulars and universals, Roman Ingarden’s notions of existential moments and modes (ways) of being are presented, and a new pair of such existential moments is introduced: multiplicity–monadicity. Also, it is argued that there are not only real universals, but instances of universals (tropes) and fictional universals too.
Keywords Universals  Particulars  Ingarden  Ways of being  Existential moments
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References found in this work BETA
Donald L. M. Baxter (2001). Instantiation as Partial Identity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (4):449 – 464.

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