Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View

Philosophia 39 (2):309-310 (2011)
Rebecca Roache’s recent critique of David Lewis’s cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption
Keywords Fission  Cohabitation  Personal identity  Derek Parfit  David Lewis
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-010-9270-9
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press 17-40.

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S. Langford (2010). Reply to Roache. Analysis 70 (4):676-681.
Simon Langford (2007). How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):212–224.
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