Self-development as an imperfect duty
| Abstract | 'You ought to make something of yourself.' That certainly has the ring of truth about it. But is there really any obligation to develop yourself? Those who let abilities lie idle are shortsighted, of course. But are they guilty of anything more than imprudence? It is easy to think that there could be a moral fault in failing to help others such as your children to develop their talents and abilities. But what about not developing your own? And if this is a moral failing, is the fault solely in your having let others down in some way? Or is there fault in having let yourself down as well? | |||||||||
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