Scepticism and Epistemic Kinds

Noûs 34 (s1):366 - 376 (2000)
This paper responds to a claim by Christopher Hookway, that Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification (PIJ) is a platitude, and that skeptical arguments that deploy it depend essentially on a substantive thesis about the nature of epistemic kinds. This paper argues that, contrary to Hookway, the thesis about epistemic kinds is not necessary to generate skeptical results, and PIJ is sufficient to do so.
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DOI 10.2307/3050587
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