Self-reference and gödel's theorem: A Husserlian analysis [Book Review]

Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151 (2003)
Abstract
A Husserlian phenomenological approach to logic treats concepts in terms of their experiential meaning rather than in terms of reference, sets of individuals, and sentences. The present article applies such an approach in turn to the reasoning operative in various paradoxes: the simple Liar, the complex Liar paradoxes, the Grelling-type paradoxes, and Gödel’s Theorem. It finds that in each case a meaningless statement, one generated by circular definition, is treated as if were meaningful, and consequently as either true or false, although in fact it is neither. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the sentence used to express the meaningless statement is ambiguous, and may also be used to express a meaningful statement. The paradoxes result from a failure to distinguish between the two meanings the sentence may have.
Keywords self-referential statements  the Liar paradox  Godel's Theorem
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DOI 10.1023/A:1024843725932
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PhilPapers Archive Albert Johnstone, Self-reference and gödel's theorem: A Husserlian analysis
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