Should Social Preferences Be Consistent?

Economics and Philosophy 5 (01):7- (1989)
Should social preferences conform to the principles of rationality we normally expect of individuals? Should they, for instance, conform to the consistency axioms of expected utility theory? This article considers one fragment of this question
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DOI 10.1017/S0266267100002236
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References found in this work BETA
Amartya Sen (1983). Liberty and Social Choice. Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):5-28.
John Broome (1987). Utilitarianism and Expected Utility. Journal of Philosophy 84 (8):405-422.
Peter J. Hammond (1982). Utilitarianism, Uncertainty and Information. In Amartya Kumar Sen & Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond. Cambridge University Press 85--102.

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