David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 31 (3):357 – 369 (1988)
It is argued in this article that the concept of practice is one of the key concepts in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. It partly replaces his earlier talk about the inexpressible. ?The practice has to speak for itself, as Wittgenstein succinctly puts it. The concept of practice not only points to the ways in which the unity of our concepts are underpinned, as Gordon Baker has it, it also comprises the skills involved in handling the conceptualized phenomena, our prereflective familiarity with them, expressed in the sureness in our behaviour towards them, and the judgmental power exercised in applying or withholding a given concept on a particular occasion. These factors are all relevant to the establishment of knowledge, but they cannot themselves be fully and straightforwardly articulated by verbal means. Nevertheless, they represent what we go by when we apply concepts and other types of rules. To follow a rule is what Wittgenstein calls a practice. The sketched analysis of this concept makes us understand better how it is possible to apply a rule without the support of another rule. It also makes us realize in what sense one is justified in talking about tacit knowledge in connection with the application of concepts and rule?following in general. Quite a lot hangs on seeing the world aright at this point
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References found in this work BETA
Gordon P. Baker (1981). Following Wittgenstein: Some Signposts for Philosophical Investigations §§143-242. In Stephen H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule. Routledge.
J. E. Llewelyn, Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Denis Paul (1971). On Certainty. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):80.
G. E. Moore (1959). Philosophical Papers. New York, Macmillan.
G. H. von Wright (ed.) (1972). Problems in the Theory of Knowledge. The Hague,Nijhoff.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922/1999). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Dover Publications.
Citations of this work BETA
Zhenhua Yu (2012). The Expansion of Epistemology: The Metaphysical Vs. The Practical Approach. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (1):83-100.
Walter C. Okshevsky (1992). Epistemological and Hermeneutic Conceptions of the Nature of Understanding: The Cases of Paul H. Hirst and Martin Heidegger. Educational Theory 42 (1):5-23.
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