The good of self-development

Abstract

So Michael Slote argues. There is and can be no obligation to foster one's own wellbeing for Kantians, only an obligation to foster the wellbeing of others. And any distinctively Kantian position both denies that our own wellbeing is the source of our moral duties and denies that a concern for wellbeing can be a morally worthy motive. So not only is the agent's own good not foundational to morality; it is of no moral importance. Hence, Slote concludes, the devaluation of the moral agent.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivation.James Dreier - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
Comments on Michael Slote's Moral Sentimentalism.Lori Watson - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1):142-147.
Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism.Tim Mulgan - 1993 - Ratio 6 (2):121 - 134.
Rightness and Goodness in Agent-based Virtue Ethics.Liezl Van Zyl - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:103-114.
Fair trade and human wellbeing.Michael Northcott - 2010 - In John R. Atherton, Elaine L. Graham & Ian Steedman (eds.), The Practices of Happiness: Political Economy, Religion and Wellbeing. Routledge.
The moral self.Pauline Chazan - 1998 - New York: Routledge.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
7 (#1,310,999)

6 months
1 (#1,444,594)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Johnson
Norwich University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references