Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):113-83 (2004)
|Abstract||Like dreaming, hallucination has been a formative trope for modern philosophy. The vivid, often tragic, breakdown in the mind’s apparent capacity to disclose reality has long served to support a paradoxical philosophical picture of sensory experience. This picture, which of late has shaped the paradigmatic empirical understanding the senses, displays sensory acts as already complete without the external world; complete in that the direct objects even of veridical sensory acts do not transcend what we could anyway hallucinate. Hallucination is thus the mother of Representationalism, which insists that it is mental intermediaries that make other..|
|Keywords||Direct Realism Hallucination Illusion Metaphysics Object Perception|
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