Online research in philosophy

This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so by appealing to independent moral concerns such as equality. Desert-sensitive justice can deliver the appropriate compensation without relying on external moral resources. Finally, while responsibility-sensitive justice harshly refuses to provide for those whose basic needs are unsatisfied due to their own negligent actions, this result can be averted by desert-sensitive justice as it can take into account responsibility-independent considerations. In sum, desert-sensitive justice appears to offer a tighter fit with considered judgments about justice.

This essay explores the imaginative foundations of ethics, not by presenting a theory about the moral imagination, but by reconstructing the hermeneutic strategy underlying Reinhold Niebuhr's proposal for "an independent Christian ethic." The thesis is that Niebuhr's ethic cannot adequately be evaluated without careful attention to his hermeneutics, what he described as "the mythical method of interpretation." This point is argued first, by reconstructing Niebuhr's hermeneutics; second, by showing how his hermeneutics determines the strategy of his ethics; and third, by using this focus to clarify certain issues separating Niebuhr and some of his recent critics, specifically, William Frankena's criticism of his metaethics, Gene Outka's objections to his normative ethic of love as self-sacrifice; and John Howard Yoder's rejection of the strategy of his Christian realism as a whole. The essay is presented in the hope that Niebuhr's example will encourage American religious ethicists to explore the relationship between hermeneutics and ethics with greater intellectual sympathy and theoretical sophistication. The example of Niebuhr's "independent Christian ethic" is commended as one attempt to map the formal and substantive ways in which religious visions help shape our dispositions and moral choices.

The question of the psychopath's responsibility for his or her wrongdoing has received considerable attention. Much of this attention has been directed toward whether psychopaths are a counterexample to motivational internalism (MI): Do they possess normal moral beliefs, which fail to motivate them? In this paper, I argue that this is a question that remains conceptually and empirically intractable, and that we ought to settle the psychopath's responsibility in some other way. I argue that recent empirical work on the moral judgments of psychopaths provides us with good reason to think that they are not fully responsible agents, because their actions cannot express the kinds of ill-will toward others that grounds attributions of distinctively moral responsibility. I defend this view against objections, especially those due to an influential account of moral responsibility that holds that moral knowledge is not necessary for responsibility.

This article offers an introductory analysis of the philosophical and empirical considerations having to do with the significance of psychopathy, intellectual disability and ADHD regarding one’s moral responsibility. Moral responsibility comes in degrees and is ultimately determined on social grounds. Whether a certain diagnosis and its under­pinning neuro-cognitive impairment affects one’s cognitive, emotional and moral conduct, depends also on social and relational factors.

Abstract The article suggests that the teacher's professional responsibility is both a moral and a social concept but that it has been little examined. It is suggested that the concept has suffered from too narrow an interpretation under role theories. One source of philosophical ideas (from Richard Niebuhr) for re?interpreting and broadening the concept of responsibility is examined. Finally a proposal is made for a new use of the concept particularly associated with a positive assumption of responsibility by the professional teacher.

Examination of several accounts regarding the nature of moral responsibility allows the extraction of a conceptual core common to all of them. Relying on that core conception of moral responsibility, the paper explores what human life without moral responsibility would be like. That exploration establishes that many robust forms of human relationship and nonmoral normativity could continue, absent moral responsibility, even if moral responsibility were abandoned on incompatibilist grounds. Much more importantly, it also establishes, contra Waller and Pereboom, that only some forms of morality—so-called “behavioral” forms—remain possible without moral responsibility. The paper argues that normative moral approaches that take into account agent intentions in order to assess the moral status of action cannot be applied without moral responsibility of agents. Thus, morality without responsibility needs to be behavioral, not consequentialist, as has often been thought.

We evaluate people and groups as responsible or not, depending on how seriously they take their responsibilities. Often we do this informally, via moral judgment. Sometimes we do this formally, for instance in legal judgment. This article considers mainly moral responsibility, and focuses largely upon individuals. Later sections also comment on the relation between legal and moral responsibility, and on the responsibility of collectives.

Not fully recognizing that H. Richard Niebuhr, like Augustine, identifies the fundamental moral imperative with the call for conversion to faith, Niebuhr's critics have sent their barbed shafts wide of the mark. Contrary to complaints, Niebuhr's ethics, properly understood, provides both rational grounds for moral judgment and a functional normative program, while at the same time clearly specifying the necessary connection between religious faith and the life well-lived. The critical response to his work remains worthy of study because it exhibits the expectations, anxieties, and objections which any dispositional ethics will inevitably encounter and therefore must address.

This paper is an examination of Reinhold Niebuhr's embrace of the paradoxical in relation to his conception of the self. While it explores the theoretical and practical difficulties entailed in Niebuhr's account, it also seeks to defend his position, suggesting that in the light of Niebuhr's negative apologetic, the paradoxical self represents the only intelligible means of self-understanding available. Though Niebuhr never develops this epistemological ground, it may provide a way of avoiding the moral consequentialism to which Niebuhr appears to be resigned. The resulting framework points toward moral pragmatism, retaining its orientation and relevance in the midst of deliberations concerning means and ends.