The unity of a tractarian fact

Synthese 156 (2):231-251 (2007)
Abstract
It is not immediately clear from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus how to connect his idea there of an object with the logical ontologies of Frege and Russell. Toward clarification on this matter, this paper compares Russell’s and Wittgenstein’s versions of the thesis of an atomic fact that it is a complex composition. The claim arrived at is that whilst Russell (at times at least) has one particular of the elements of a fact – the relation – responsible for the unity of the whole, for Wittgenstein the unity of a fact is the product of copulative powers inherent in all its elements. All kinds of constituents of Tractarian facts – all kinds (forms) of object – are, to use Fregean terminology, unsaturated.
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Beaney (2003). 4 Russell and Frege. In Nicholas Griffin (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Cambridge University Press. 128.
Leonard Linsky (1992). The Unity of the Proposition. Journal of the History of Philosophy 30 (2):243-273.
Citations of this work BETA
Mark Textor (2009). Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's Challenge, Frege's Answer. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
Anna-Sofia Maurin (2012). Bradley's Regress. Philosophy Compass 7 (11):794-807.
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