What Were Tarski's Truth-Definitions for?

History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (2):165-179 (1989)
Tarski's manner of defining truth is generally considered highly significant. About why, there is less consensus. I argue first, that in his truth-definitions Tarski was trying to solve a set of philosophical problems; second, that he solved them successfully; third, that all of these that are simply problems about defining truth are as well or better solved by a simpler account of truth. But one of his crucial problems remains: to give an account of validity, one requires an account not just of truth but of truth under varying interpretations. Tarski's account has the merit of generalizing to this, to model theory and to abstract algebra
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (2010). Truth and Meaning. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 304 - 323.
John F. Fox (1987). Truthmaker. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):188 – 207.

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