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How should philosophy be clear? Loaded clarity, default clarity, and Adorno

Telos (146):73–95 (2009)
Abstract [First paragraph:] Part of the point of this article is to support the following claim by Adorno: “Rarely has anyone laid out a theory of philosophical clarity; instead, the concept of clarity has been used as though it were self-evident.” In fact, and again with Adorno, I shall argue for what I call the “loadedness thesis”: the thesis that philosophical conceptions of clarity are pervasively, and perhaps inevitably, philosophically partisan (section one). Yet I shall proceed to argue for a conception of clarity nonetheless (section two). Such clarity I take as “default clarity,” in that, while there could be reason to eschew it, the burden of proof lies on those who would. That thought is not Adornian. But I shall consider Adorno as an attempt to discharge that burden of proof (section three).
Keywords Adorno  Clarity  Metaphilosophy
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