David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Telos: Critical Theory of the Contemporary 2009 (146):73–95 (2009)
[First paragraph:] Part of the point of this article is to support the following claim by Adorno: “Rarely has anyone laid out a theory of philosophical clarity; instead, the concept of clarity has been used as though it were self-evident.” In fact, and again with Adorno, I shall argue for what I call the “loadedness thesis”: the thesis that philosophical conceptions of clarity are pervasively, and perhaps inevitably, philosophically partisan (section one). Yet I shall proceed to argue for a conception of clarity nonetheless (section two). Such clarity I take as “default clarity,” in that, while there could be reason to eschew it, the burden of proof lies on those who would. That thought is not Adornian. But I shall consider Adorno as an attempt to discharge that burden of proof (section three).
|Keywords||Adorno Clarity Metaphilosophy|
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Nicholas Joll (2009). Adorno's Negative Dialectic: Theme, Point, and Methodological Status. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2):233–53.
Valerie Hobbs (2015). Looking Again at Clarity in Philosophy: Writing as a Shaper and Sharpener of Thought. Philosophy 90 (1):135-142.
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