David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 151 (3):435 - 443 (2006)
It is argued that John Bickle's Ruthless Reductionism is flawed as an account of the practice of neuroscience. Examples from genetics and linguistics suggest, first, that not every mind-brain link or gene-phenotype link qualifies as a reduction or as a complete explanation, and, second, that the higher (psychological) level of analysis is not likely to disappear as neuroscience progresses. The most plausible picture of the evolving sciences of the mind-brain seems a patchwork of multiple connections and partial explanations, linking anatomy, mechanisms and functions across different domains, levels, and grain sizes. Bickle's claim that only the molecular level provides genuine explanations, and higher level concepts are just heuristics that will soon be redundant, is thus rejected. In addition, it is argued that Bickle's recasting of philosophy of science as metascience explicating empirical practices, ignores an essential role for philosophy in reflecting upon criteria for reduction and explanation. Many interesting and complex issues remain to be investigated for the philosophy of science, and in particular the nature of interlevel links found in empirical research requires sophisticated philosophical analysis.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
John W. Bickle (2008). Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave. A Bradford Book.
Peter K. Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver (2000). Thinking About Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
John Bickle (2003). Philosophy and Neuroscience a Ruthlessly Reductive Account. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Darwin's Dangerous Idea. Behavior and Philosophy 24 (2):169-174.
Kenneth F. Schaffner (1993). Discovery and Explanation in Biology and Medicine. University of Chicago Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Huib Looren de Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track—Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435-443.
Huib L. de Jong (2006). Explicating Pluralism: Where the Mind to Molecule Pathway Gets Off the Track - Reply to Bickle. Synthese 151 (3):435-443.
Huib L. de Jong & Maurice K. D. Schouten (2005). Ruthless Reductionism: A Review Essay of John Bickle's Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):473-486.
Joseph U. Neisser (2005). The Shape of Things to Come: Psychoneural Reduction and the Future of Psychology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):259-269.
Verena Gottschling (2005). The Mind Reduced to Molecules? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):279-283.
Dorothée Legrand & Franck Grammont (2005). A Matter of Facts. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):249-257.
Timothy J. Bayne & Jordi Fernandez (2005). Resisting Ruthless Reductionism: A Commentary on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):239-48.
Huib L. de Jong (2002). Levels of Explanation in Biological Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):441-462.
Janez Bregant, Andraž Stožer & Marko Cerkvenik (2010). Molecular Reduction: Reality or Fiction? [REVIEW] Synthese 172 (3):437 - 450.
John Bickle (2005). Molecular Neuroscience to My Rescue (Again): Reply to Looren de Jong and Schouten. Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):487-494.
Anne Jaap Jacobson (2005). Is the Brain a Memory Box? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):271-278.
Robert C. Richardson (1999). Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: New Wave Reductionism. Philosopical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
John Bickle (2006). Reducing Mind to Molecular Pathways: Explicating the Reductionism Implicit in Current Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience. [REVIEW] Synthese 151 (3):411-434.
Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell
John Bickle (2005). Precis of Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):231-238.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads4 ( #424,619 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?