Online research in philosophy

The philosophical debate whether the epistemological and conceptual structure of science is better characterized as hierarchical or as holistic cannot be decideda priori. A case study on general relativity should help to clarify our representation of this section of physics. For this purpose Sneed's model-theoretic approach is used to reconstruct the structure of relativity. The proposed axiomatization of general relativity takes into account approximations and utilizes local models for a realistic view on the functioning of the theory. A central objective of the paper is to give an explication of the approximative empirical claim of general relativity, which is designed to identify the empirical content of the theory in a weak hierarchical form.

An astonishing volume and diversity of evidence is available for many hypotheses in the biomedical and social sciences. Some of this evidence—usually from randomized controlled trials (RCTs)—is amalgamated by meta-analysis. Despite the ongoing debate regarding whether or not RCTs are the ‘gold-standard’ of evidence, it is usually meta-analysis which is considered the best source of evidence: meta-analysis is thought by many to be the platinum standard of evidence. However, I argue that meta-analysis falls far short of that standard. Different meta-analyses of the same evidence can reach contradictory conclusions. Meta-analysis fails to provide objective grounds for intersubjective assessments of hypotheses because numerous decisions must be made when performing a meta-analysis which allow wide latitude for subjective idiosyncrasies to influence its outcome. I end by suggesting that an older tradition of evidence in medicine—the plurality of reasoning strategies appealed to by the epidemiologist Sir Bradford Hill—is a superior strategy for assessing a large volume and diversity of evidence.

Summary It is here shown that the relativistic doctrine of the relativity of simultaneity is untenable and that both the special and general theories of relativity are inconsistent. It is also shown that the theories can perhaps be made consistent, but excessively weak, through the reintroduction of absolute space and a weakening of the Lorentz transformations. Non-relativistic hypotheses for some events thought to require relativity are suggested. Finally, some conjectures are made on how so wrong a theory could have been accepted by so many for so long.

Can some evidence confirm a conjunction of two hypotheses more than it confirms either of the hypotheses separately? We show that it can, moreover under conditions that are the same for ten different measures of confirmation. Further we demonstrate that it is even possible for the conjunction of two disconfirmed hypotheses to be confirmed by the same evidence.

Philosophers of physics should be more attentive to the role energy conditions play in General Relativity. I review the changing status of energy conditions for quantum fields-presently there are no singularity theorems for semiclassical General Relativity. So we must reevaluate how we understand the relationship between General Relativity, Quantum Field Theory, and singularities. Moreover, on our present understanding of what it is to be a physically reasonable field, the standard energy conditions are violated classically. Thus the singularity theorems are unavailable for classical General Relativity. Our understanding of singularities in General Relativity turns on delicate issues of what it is to be a matter field-issues distinct from the content of the theory.

I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level empirical hypotheses and highly general theoretical principles. This last point is illustrated with a brief sketch of the issues involved in the parametric framework analysis of tests of physical theories such as General Relativity and of fundamental physical principles such as the Einstein Equivalence Principle.

I propose a gentle reconciliation of Quantum Theory and General Relativity. It is possible to add small, but unshackling constraints to the quantum fields, making them compatible with General Relativity. Not all solutions of the Schrodinger's equation are needed. I show that the continuous and spatially separable solutions are sufficient for the nonlocal manifestations associated with entanglement and wavefunction collapse. After extending this idea to quantum fields, I show that Quantum Field Theory can be defined in terms of partitioned classical fields. One key element is the idea of integral interactions, which also helps clarifying the quantum measurement and classical level problems. The unity of Quantum Theory and General Relativity can now be gained with the help of the partitioned fields' energy-momentum. A brief image of a General Relativistic Quantum Standard Model is outlined.

I propose a gentle reconciliation of Quantum Theory and General Relativity. It is possible to add small, but unshackling constraints to the quantum fields, making them compatible with General Relativity. Not all solutions of the Schrodinger's equation are needed. I show that the continuous and spatially separable solutions are sufficient for the nonlocal manifestations associated with entanglement and wavefunction collapse. After extending this idea to quantum fields, I show that Quantum Field Theory can be defined in terms of partitioned classical fields. One key element is the idea of integral interactions, which also helps clarifying the quantum measurement and classical level problems. The unity of Quantum Theory and General Relativity can now be gained with the help of the partitioned fields' energy-momentum. A brief image of a General Relativistic Quantum Standard Model is outlined.

Confirmation theory is the study of the logic by which scientific hypotheses may be confirmed or disconfirmed, or even refuted by evidence. A specific theory of confirmation is a proposal for such a logic. Presumably the epistemic evaluation of scientific hypotheses should largely depend on their empirical content – on what they say the evidentially accessible parts of the world are like, and on the extent to which they turn out to be right about that. Thus, all theories of confirmation rely on measures of how well various alternative hypotheses account for the evidence.1 Most contemporary confirmation theories employ probability functions to provide such a measure. They measure how well the evidence fits what the hypothesis says about the world in terms of how likely it is that the evidence should occur were the hypothesis true. Such hypothesis-based probabilities of evidence claims are called likelihoods. Clearly, when the evidence is more likely according to one hypothesis than according to an alternative, that should redound to the credit of the former hypothesis and the discredit of the later. But various theories of confirmation diverge on precisely how this credit is to be measured?

S CIENTISTS often claim that an experiment or observation tests certain hypotheses within a complex theory but not others. Relativity theorists, for example, are unanimous in the judgment that measurements of the gravitational red shift do not test the field equations of general relativity; psychoanalysts sometimes complain that experimental tests of Freudian theory are at best tests of rather peripheral hypotheses; astronomers do not regard observations of the positions of a single planet as a test of Kepler's third law, even though those observations may test Kepler's first and second laws. Observations are regarded as relevant to some hypotheses in a theory but not relevant to others in that same theory. There is another kind of scientific judgment that may or may not be related to such judgments of relevance: determinations of the accuracy of the predictions of some theories are not held to provide tests of those theories, or, at least, positive results are not held to support or confirm the theories in question. There are, for example, special relativistic theories of gravity that predict the same phenomena as does general relativity, yet the theories are regarded as..