Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism

History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):267-281 (2002)
What is the rational response when confronted with a set of propositions each of which we have some reason to accept, and yet which taken together form an inconsistent class? This was, in a nutshell, the problem addressed by the Jaina logicians of classical India, and the solution they gave is, I think, of great interest, both for what it tells us about the relationship between rationality and consistency, and for what we can learn about the logical <span class='Hi'>basis</span> of philosophical pluralism. The Jainas claim that we can continue to reason in spite of the presence of inconsistencies, and indeed construct a many-valued logical system tailored to the purpose. My aim in this paper is to offer a new interpretation of that system and to try to draw out some of its philosophical implications.
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DOI 10.1080/0144534021000051505
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References found in this work BETA
G. Priest (1984). Hyper-contradictions. Logique Et Analyse 27 (7):237.

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Graham Priest (2008). Jaina Logic: A Contemporary Perspective. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (3):263-278.

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