Locke on Real Essences, Intelligibility and Natural Kinds

Abstract
In this paper I criticize arguments by Pauline Phemister and Matthew Stuart that John Locke's position in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding allows for natural kinds based on similarities among real essences. On my reading of Locke, not only are similarities among real essences irrelevant to species, but natural kind theories based on them are unintelligible.
Keywords John Locke  Natural Kinds  Real Essences  Pauline Phemister  Matthew Stuart
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