David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognitive Science 28 (3):409-432 (2004)
Jerry Fodor has argued that the multiple realizability argument, as discussed in his original “Special Sciences” article, “refutes psychophysical reductionism once and for all.” I argue that his argument in “Special Sciences” does no such thing. Furthermore, if one endorses the physicalism that most supporters of the “Special Sciences” view endorse, special science laws must be reducible, in principle. The compatibility of MR with reduction, however, need not threaten the autonomy of the special sciences.
|Keywords||Special Sciences Reductionism Mental states Mind‐body problem Fodor Physical states|
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
David K. Lewis (1983). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Jaegwon Kim (1993). Supervenience and Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Todd Jones (2004). Reduction and Anti-Reduction: Rights and Wrongs. Metaphilosophy 25 (5):614-647.
Todd Jones (2008). Explanations of Social Phenomena: Competing and Complementary Accounts. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):621-650.
Todd Jones (2012). Do Customs Compete with Conditioning? Turf Battles and Division of Labor in Social Explanation. Synthese 184 (3):407-430.
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