Ethics 123 (1):61-85 (2012)
I present and defend an account of three-place trustworthiness according to which B is trustworthy with respect to A in domain of interaction D, if and only if she is competent with respect to that domain, and she would take the fact that A is counting on her, were A to do so in this domain, to be a compelling reason for acting as counted on. This is not the whole story of trustworthiness, however, for we want those we can count on to identify themselves so that we can place our trust wisely.
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DOI 10.1086/667838
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