Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (1):92–102 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
577 (#29,283)

6 months
22 (#114,172)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Schaffer
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalness.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1.
Metaphysically explanatory unification.David Mark Kovacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1659-1683.
Quiddistic Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):1-32.

View all 97 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
Is there a fundamental level?Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):498–517.
Against structural universals.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.
Truthmakers for negative truths.George Molnar - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):72 – 86.
Making Mind Matter More.Jerry A. Fodor - 1989 - Philosophical Topics 17 (1):59-79.

View all 7 references / Add more references