Williams on supervaluationism and logical revisionism
Journal of Philosophy 108 (11) (2011)
| Abstract | Central to discussion of supervaluationist accounts of vagueness is the extent to which they require revisions of classical logic and if so, whether those revisions are objectionable. In an important recent Journal of Philosophy article, J.R.G. Williams presents a powerful challenge to the orthodox view that supervaluationism is objectionably revisionary. Williams argues both that supervaluationism is non-revisionary and that even if it were, those revisions would be unobjectionable. This note shows that his arguments for both claims fail. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Vagueness Supervaluationism Robbie Williams | |||||||||
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