Blocking Rowe's New Evidential Argument from Evil

Religious Studies 37 (4):435 - 449 (2001)
Abstract
The first part of this paper exposits William Rowe's latest version of the evidential argument from evil. Integral to this new version is what we can call the 'level-playing field' requirement, which regulates probability values. It is the argument of the second part of this paper that either the two premises of the new version are regulated by the level-playing-field requirement or they're not. If they are both regulated, then no one would be in position to rationally accept one of those premises; if they're not both regulated, then the theist would have good reason to reject the one that is. Either way, Rowe's latest version of the evidential argument fails.
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Daniel Howard-Snyder (1990). Surplus Evil. Philosophical Quarterly 40:78-86.
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