David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Theoria 25 (2):187-196 (2010)
In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least somethinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
Greg Janzen (2006). The Representational Theory of Phenomenal Character: A Phenomenological Critique. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4):321-339.
Paul Coates, Sense-Data. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Casey O'Callaghan (forthcoming). Not All Perceptual Experience is Modality Specific. In Mohan Matthen, Dustin Stokes & Stephen Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford.
Robert Schroer (2009). Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism? Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110.
David J. Chalmers (2004). The Representational Character of Experience. In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 153--181.
Diana Raffman (2005). Some Thoughts About Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):163-170.
Carlos Muñoz-Suárez, Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.
Eric Lormand (1996). Consciousness. In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
Greg Janzen (2008). Intentionalism and Change Blindness. Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.
Ron Chrisley & J. Parthemore (2007). Synthetic Phenomenology:Exploiting Embodiment to Specify the Non-Conceptual Content of Visual Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):44-58.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads4 ( #195,393 of 1,004,653 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,617 of 1,004,653 )
How can I increase my downloads?