David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (5):887-916 (2011)
In this article, I develop a higher-order interpretation of Leibniz's theory of consciousness according to which memory is constitutive of consciousness. I offer an account of Leibniz's theory of memory on which his theory of consciousness may be based, and I then show that Leibniz could have developed a coherent higher-order account. However, it is not clear whether Leibniz held (or should have held) such an account of consciousness; I sketch an alternative that has at least as many advantages as the higher-order theory. This analysis provides an important antecedent to the contemporary discussions of higher-order theories of consciousness
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References found in this work BETA
Stefano Di Bella (2005). The Science of the Individual: Leibniz's Ontology of Individual Substance. Springer.
Rocco J. Gennaro & Charles Huenemann (eds.) (1999). New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press.
Nicholas Jolley (1986). Leibniz. Journal of the History of Philosophy 24 (1):129-130.
Nicholas Jolley (1984). Leibniz and Locke: A Study of the New Essays on Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Marleen Rozemond (2014). Mills Can't Think: Leibniz's Approach to the Mind-Body Problem. Res Philosophica 91 (1):1-28.
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