The sky over canberra: Folk discourse and serious metaphysics

Philosophia 38 (2):365-383 (2010)
Abstract
I take up the task of examining how someone who takes seriously the ambitious programme of conceptual analysis advocated by the Canberra School can minimise the eliminative consequences which I argue the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis recipe of conceptual analysis is likely to have for many folk discourses. The objective is to find a stable means to preserve the constative appearance of folk discourse and to find it generally successful in its attempts to describe an external world, albeit in non-scientific terms that do not reflect the nature of things. The view I settle on, quasi-fictionalism, is modelled on a modified descriptivist version of Kendall Walton’s account of prop-oriented games of make-believe.
Keywords Frank Jackson  Conceptual analysis  Canberra plan  Folk discourses  Fictionalism  Ontological commitment  Kendall Walton
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References found in this work BETA
John Dupré (1986). Sex, Gender, and Essence. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):441-457.
Frank Jackson (1998). Reference and Description Revisited. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):201-218.
Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). Ethical Particularism and Patterns. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral Particularism. Oxford University Press. 79--99.

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