David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):555-578 (2010)
It has sometimes been suggested that people represent the structure of action in terms of an action tree. A question now arises about the relationship between this action tree representation and people’s moral judgments. A natural hypothesis would be that people first construct a representation of the action tree and then go on to use this representation in making moral judgments. The present paper argues for a more complex view. Specifically, the paper reports a series of experimental studies that appear to show that people’s moral judgments can actually impact their representations of the action tree itself
|Keywords||Action trees Moral cognition Moral grammar Moral judgment|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1970). A Theory of Human Action. Princeton University Press.
John Mikhail (2007). Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence, and the Future. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):143 –152.
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Citations of this work BETA
Alex Wiegmann & Michael R. Waldmann (2014). Transfer Effects Between Moral Dilemmas: A Causal Model Theory. Cognition 131 (1):28-43.
Marcel Meyer (2015). Positive Business: Doing Good and Doing Well. Business Ethics: A European Review 24 (S2):175-197.
Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Brian Robinson, Paul Stey & Mark Alfano (2015). Reversing the Side-Effect Effect: The Power of Salient Norms. Philosophical Studies 172 (1):177-206.
Emmanuel Chemla, Paul Egré & Philippe Schlenker (2015). Predicting Moral Judgments From Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):21-48.
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