Action Trees and Moral Judgment

Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (3):555-578 (2010)
Abstract
It has sometimes been suggested that people represent the structure of action in terms of an action tree. A question now arises about the relationship between this action tree representation and people’s moral judgments. A natural hypothesis would be that people first construct a representation of the action tree and then go on to use this representation in making moral judgments. The present paper argues for a more complex view. Specifically, the paper reports a series of experimental studies that appear to show that people’s moral judgments can actually impact their representations of the action tree itself
Keywords Action trees  Moral cognition  Moral grammar  Moral judgment
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References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.

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Citations of this work BETA
Corey McGrath (2011). Can Substitution Inferences Explain the Knobe Effect? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):667-679.
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