David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Papers 34 (1):1-24 (2005)
Abstract In this paper, I investigate the purported dilemma between a symmetrical conception of time and the denial of what I call Universal Logical Determinateness (ULD). According to the dilemma, the timeless and universal application of logical laws to all propositions necessitates either the view that the past and future are both open, or that they are both closed. My investigation proceeds by way of an assessment of Taylor's argument for fatalism, then of Dummet's presentation and refutation of the fatalistic argument, and finally of Dummet's analogous argument which attempts to prove the possibility of an open past. In all cases, we find that the arguments implicitly rely upon the assumption that there exists a necessary connection between the truth aptness of propositions and the fixity (or non-fixity) of events. I question this assumption and conclude that any argument for the symmetry of time which relies upon it begs the question against the asymmetry of time
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References found in this work BETA
R. D. Bradley (1959). Must the Future Be What It is Going to Be. Mind 68 (270):193-208.
Sarah Broadie (2001). From Necessity to Fate: A Fallacy. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 5 (1):21-37.
David Buller (1995). On the 'Standard' Argument for Fatalism. Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125.
Joseph Diekemper (2004). Temporal Necessity and Logical Fatalism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (3):287–294.
Richard M. Gale (1968). The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays. London, Macmillan.
Citations of this work BETA
Joseph Diekemper (2007). B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism. Noûs 41 (3):429–452.
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