Nonconceptual Content: From Perceptual Experience to Subpersonal Computational States

Mind and Language 10 (4):333-369 (1995)
Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive proceses that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal information-processing systems. What makes these states content-involving is their satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representation-driven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.1995.tb00019.x
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Robert Hanna (2008). Kantian Non-Conceptualism. Philosophical Studies 137 (1):41 - 64.
Declan Smithies (2012). The Mental Lives of Zombies. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.

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