Expressivism and motivation internalism
Analysis 62 (4):336–344 (2002)
| Abstract | The task of this paper is to argue that expressivism [the thesis that moral judgements function to express desires, emotions, or pro/con attitudes] neither implies, nor is implied by, [motivational internalism]. | |||||||||
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