Imagining experiences correctly
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370 (2003)
| Abstract | According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this constraint in terms of the subject's possession of a concept of the experience. The account implies that the imagination is active in conscious perception | |||||||||
| Keywords | Disassociation Epistemology Experience Imagination Perception | |||||||||
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