Metaethics and the empirical sciences

Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):133 – 148 (2006)
What contribution can the empirical sciences make to metaethics? This paper outlines an argument to a particular metaethical conclusion - that moral judgments are epistemically unjustified - that depends in large part on a posteriori premises.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790500492748
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