Metaethics and the empirical sciences
Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):133 – 148 (2006)
| Abstract | What contribution can the empirical sciences make to metaethics? This paper outlines an argument to a particular metaethical conclusion - that moral judgments are epistemically unjustified - that depends in large part on a posteriori premises. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesWalter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press.
Mark Schroeder (2012). Philosophy of Language for Metaethics. In Gillian Russell & Delia Graff Fara (eds.), The Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Routledge.
Stephen Darwall (1999). Why Ethics is Part of Philosophy. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1:19-28.
Tristram McPherson (2008). Metaethics & the Autonomy of Morality. Philosophers' Imprint 8 (6):1-16.
Frederick Rauscher (1997). How a Kantian Can Accept Evolutionary Metaethics. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3).
Karen Jones (2006). Metaethics and Emotions Research: A Response to Prinz. Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.
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