The Skeptick's Tale [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):213 - 221 (2009)
Any metaethicist tempted to dismiss a defense of moral intuitionism as too flaky to merit serious attention should think twice. Ethical Intuitionism is a forceful, clear, original, and intelligent piece of philosophy, and Michael Huemer can be proud of his efforts. He proceeds by identifying an exhaustive list of five possible metaethical positions, then knocks down four until only his favored intuitionism remains. One of the advantages of any such “last man standing” strategy is that even the most hardened opponent is likely to be cheering on the author at least a lot of the time: The noncognitivist will support the demolition of subjectivism, the naturalist will applaud the humbling of the noncognitivist, and so on. Speaking as a moral error theorist, I was myself nodding along as Huemer undermined first the noncognitivist, then the subjectivist, and then the reductive naturalist. Yet even here, where my sympathies lay firmly with Huemer’s negative conclusions, I could perceive avenues for reply against his charges. But I don’t at present have the luxury of space to speak in defense of those whom I would, on other occasions and on other grounds, myself attack. Let them tell their own tales. I remain more-or-less on Huemer’s side through the first four chapters, and it is not until he gets to the case against moral nihilism that my own favorite view comes under attack. Thus, for the remainder, I shall don my moral nihilist’s hat and speak against Huemer’s dismissal of that viewpoint
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Michael Huemer (2007). Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30-55.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2006). Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology. In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Joyce (2009). Is Moral Projectivism Empirically Tractable? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):53 - 75.
Similar books and articles
Alan Carter (2006). A Defense of Egalitarianism. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):269 - 302.
Nathan Hanna (2011). Against Phenomenal Conservatism. Acta Analytica 26 (3):213-221.
Elizabeth Tropman (2009). Renewing Moral Intuitionism. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (4):440-463.
Michael Huemer (2008). Revisionary Intuitionism. Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):368-392.
Michael Huemer (2009). Précis of Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):192-196.
N. Lemos (2008). Review: Michael Huemer: Ethical Intuitionism. [REVIEW] Mind 117 (466):483-486.
Richard Joyce, Metaethical Pluralism: How Both Moral Naturalism and Moral Skepticism May Be Permissible Positions.
Michael Huemer (2005). Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Mark Schroeder (2009). Huemer's Clarkeanism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):197 - 204.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads68 ( #59,123 of 1,789,722 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #195,809 of 1,789,722 )
How can I increase my downloads?