Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!
Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26 (2002)
| Abstract | The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | No categories specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,705 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesHenry E. Kyburg (2002). Don't Take Unnecessary Chances! Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26.
Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.
Paul Humphreys (2004). Some Considerations on Conditional Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
Marc Lange (2006). Do Chances Receive Equal Treatment Under the Laws? Or: Must Chances Be Probabilities? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):383-403.
M. Albert (2007). The Propensity Theory: A Decision-Theoretic Restatement. Synthese 156 (3):587 - 603.
Colin Howson (1984). Probabilities, Propensities, and Chances. Erkenntnis 21 (3):279 - 293.
Thomas Bartelborth (2011). Propensities and Transcendental Assumptions. Erkenntnis 74 (3):363-381.
Jenann Ismael (1996). What Chances Could Not Be. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91.
Christopher S. I. Mccurdy (1996). Humphrey's Paradox and the Interpretation of Inverse Conditional Propensities. Synthese 108 (1):105 - 125.
Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.
Luke Glynn (2010). Deterministic Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.
Barry Loewer (2004). David Lewis's Humean Theory of Objective Chance. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):1115--25.
Marshall Abrams (2007). Fitness and Propensity's Annulment? Biology and Philosophy 22 (1):115-130.
Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson (2012). Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 187 (1):33-48.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-05-29Total downloads3 ( #202,056 of 549,198 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,397 of 549,198 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
