Don't Take Unnecessary Chances!

Synthese 132 (1/2):9 - 26 (2002)
The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the "single case" application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. "Propensities" are needed only in theoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/20117269
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,658
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2007). Probability in GRW Theory. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (2):371-389.
Paul Humphreys (2004). Some Considerations on Conditional Chances. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):667-680.
Jenann Ismael (1996). What Chances Could Not Be. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (1):79-91.
Nuel Belnap (2007). Propensities and Probabilities. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B 38 (3):593-625.
Luke Glynn (2010). Deterministic Chance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (1):51–80.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

7 ( #304,000 of 1,726,151 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #289,836 of 1,726,151 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.