Nonconceptual content and the "space of reasons"

Philosophical Review 109 (4):483-523 (2000)
Abstract
In Mind and World, John McDowell argues against the view that perceptual representation is non-conceptual. The central worry is that this view cannot offer any reasonable account of how perception bears rationally upon belief. I argue that this worry, though sensible, can be met, if we are clear that perceptual representation is, though non-conceptual, still in some sense 'assertoric': Perception, like belief, represents things as being thus and so.
Keywords nonconceptual content
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Wayne Wu (2011). What is Conscious Attention? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):93-120.
Susanna Schellenberg (2011). Ontological Minimalism About Phenomenology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):1-40.

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