Online research in philosophy

The Supreme Court frequently uses two tools to gather information about which cases to hear following a petition for writ of certiorari: the call for response and the call for the views of the Solicitor General. To date, there has been no empirical analysis of how the Supreme Court deploys these tools and little qualitative study. This Article fills in basic gaps in the literature by providing concrete answers to common questions regarding these two tools and offers detailed analysis of how and why states, private parties, and the United States (through the Solicitor General) respond to petitions. In addition, the Article provides much-needed data for litigators and litigants to be able to estimate the probability of their case being heard by the Court, and provides insight on how to react when the Court calls for a response or calls for the views of the Solicitor General. To reach these conclusions, the Article relies on detailed, quantitative analysis of a novel, 30,000-petition dataset, as well as interviews with top Supreme Court litigators, former Supreme Court clerks, and former staff of the Clerk’s office.

On October 19, 2004, the European Court of Justice held its first en banc hearing since the 2004 enlargement to twenty-five Member States. The case was Opinion 1/03, involving a request by the Council of the European Union on whether the Community has exclusive or shared competence to conclude the Lugano Convention. While the case on its face deals only with a single convention, it has far broader implications and is likely to influence the development of private international law and private law on a Community level for years to come. This brief article traces the origins of the issues faced in the Lugano case and provides comment on some of its implications for the future.

Unit I. Fundamental characteristics of the common law. The source of law -- The jury -- The adversary system of trial -- Retroactivity: a return to stare decisis -- Unit II. The courts and their jurisdiction. Court systems in the United States -- Court system in England -- Unit III. Constitutional law. Judicial review -- Equal protection -- Freedom of speech -- Appendix I. Constitution of the United States -- Appendix II. Table of Supreme Court cases -- Appendix III. Common case citations.

Punitive damages have been a controversial aspect of U.S. law; often criticized both at home and abroad. Neither U.S. law on punitive damages nor the foreign climate regarding their reception has remained static. This article notes the continuing legislative attack on punitive damages in the United States at both the state and federal level, and focuses on recent developments in case law and treaty negotiations concerning the reception of punitive damages abroad.The article begins with a brief review of the background against which current punitive damages law in the United States continues to operate, followed by consideration of the continuing evolution of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence on punitive damages. The Beals case in the Supreme Court of Canada and new uniform Canadian legislation on the enforcement of foreign judgments demonstrate two very different approaches to U.S. punitive damages by foreign courts. The issue is also the focus of Article 11 of the new Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which offers a much more moderate approach than the Canadian uniform act, which, if widely adopted, would constitute a major step back in terms of predictability in business and judicial relationships.

State universities have grown to become monumental enterprises generating revenues of more than $124 billion a year in the sale and delivery of education and other services. They compete in a marketplace composed of private secular, nonsecular and for-profit higher education institutions. In addition, state universities in their own right engage in a number of traditionally for-profit "business" enterprises competing with the private sector. However, as the enterprise aspect of state universities grows; so too does the impact of a unique competitive advantage enjoyed solely by state universities--that is, the ability of state universities to immune themselves from lawsuit in federal court under the guise of "sovereign immunity" for disputes arising under federal employment laws. Indeed, as a consequence of recent Supreme Court rulings, state agencies, including universities, are the only entities in the United States that are effectively exempt from the enforcement of federal employment laws in federal or state courts. This article reviews the condition of the "two faces" of the state university regarding federal employment law and the apparent new barriers to federal court access of employees to judicial review of employment disputes.

A pair of U.S. Supreme Court cases in the mid-1980s created the exhaustion doctrine of federal Indian law - that cases within federal jurisdiction that raise a colorable claim of tribal jurisdiction should be litigated first in tribal court. Only when tribal remedies are exhausted may the losing party seek review in federal court. This federal post-exhaustion review raises two central questions: First, what standard of review should the federal courts employ in reviewing tribal court determinations? And second, what exactly are the federal courts entitled to review once tribal remedies have been exhausted? Underlying these questions is the issue of differentiating between tribal law and federal law. The existing standard of review between the two varies dramatically. Tribal court determinations of tribal law are entitled to absolute deference while tribal court determinations of federal law are generally reviewed de novo. Although federal courts may redetermine at least some issues of federal law on post-exhaustion review, proper respect for tribal courts and legislatures mandates that federal courts not review issues of tribal law. Thus, this article argues that proper deference to the sovereign powers of Indian tribes and tribal courts requires the federal courts, on post-exhaustion review, to scrupulously distinguish tribal court rulings on tribal law from rulings on federal law. Given that federal courts have apparently taken de novo review powers over all questions of federal law decided by tribal courts (whether that is legitimate or not), tribal courts are in some danger of serving merely as preliminary fact finders for federal district courts. This article proposes that federal courts can preserve the rights and values of tribal courts as instruments of tribal self-government only by carefully limiting questions of federal law to appropriate issues.

With the decision in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the United States Supreme Court overstepped the bounds of the government-to-government relationship between Tribal Nations and the United States. The Strate decision follows a recent trend in the Supreme Court's decisions or judicial activism in terms of federal Indian law, and also signals a return to former anti-Indian underpinnings in its decisions of the early 1900s. This article will examine: Part I, the legal background of the Strate v. A-1 Contractors decision; Part II, the Strate v. A-1 Contractors by the United States Supreme Court; Part III, the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations and the conflicts with the Strate decision; and Part IV, the pragmatic future impact of the Strate decision on the exercise of tribal jurisdiction.

While overshadowed by rulings concerning the rights of detainees, executive power and judicial review in the "war on terror," the Supreme Court recently issued three surprisingly significant decisions on international law. These cases show a realistic reaffirmation by the Supreme Court of international law's central importance to U.S. jurisprudence, the rejection of a post-war conservative belittlement as well as an apparent disdain for it, and a prudent determination of Congressional intent and judicial precedent in global commerce. While dealing with quite technical issues of the federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction in alien torts, sovereign immunity and antitrust, these three decisions suggest a return to pragmatism by the Supreme Court. Taken together they provide a sensible balancing of foreign policy concerns within the context of the separation of powers and foreign relations. They also serve as a counterweight to the political degradation of international law that started with the Reagan-Bush era and continued through the current Bush administration.

While international judicial forums such as the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), and regional criminal courts have been important developments, based on actual use and successful results the dispute settlement system of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") has had much greater impact. Most settlement of disputes between persons of different countries takes place, however, not at the ICJ, or the ICC, or the WTO, but in private arbitration and in litigation before national courts. Peace (and justice) are promoted and kept on a regular basis through the process of reaching decisions in specific cases involving specific parties. In all of this, lawyers play the central role-as advocates, as judges, as arbitrators. Lawyers are day-to-day peacemakers. This article considers one part of the evolution of Europe: the developing competence of the European Union over matters of private law, private international law, and judicial cooperation - in other words, the role of the European Union (through the institutions of the European Community) in private litigation.