Noûs 11 (2):133-150 (1977)
|Abstract||The main goal of this paper is to urge that the normal platonistic account of mathematical truth is unsatisfactory even if pure abstract entities are assumed to exist (in a non-Question-Begging way). It is argued that the task of delineating an interpretation of a formal mathematical theory among pure abstract entities is not one that can be accomplished. An important effect of this conclusion on the question of the ontological commitments of informal mathematical theories is discussed. The paper concludes with a sketch of a non-Platonistic theory of mathematical truth which utilizes an unanalyzed notion of logical possibility|
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