Ontology, Modality, and the Fallacy of Reference

Cambridge University Press (1993)
Abstract
This is a book about the concept of a physical thing and about how the names of things relate to the things they name. It questions the prevalent view that names 'refer to' or 'denote' the things they name. Instead it presents a new theory of proper names, according to which names express certain special properties that the things they name exhibit. This theory leads to some important conclusions about whether things have any of their properties as a matter of necessity. This will be an important book for philosophers in metaphysics and the philosophy of language, though it will also interest linguists concerned with the semantics of natural language.
Keywords Reference (Philosophy  Names  Identity (Philosophical concept  Essentialism (Philosophy  Necessity (Philosophy  Ontology  Modality (Logic
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Call number B105.R25.J83 1993
ISBN(s) 0521433991   0521108578   9780521433990
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Crawford L. Elder (2007). Conventionalism and the World as Bare Sense-Data. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):261 – 275.
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