Conscious experience and the nontrivality principle
Philosophical Studies 91 (1):91-101 (1998)
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| Keywords | Conscious Experience Functionalism Metaphysics Mind | |||||||||
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Eric Schwitzgebel (2000). How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Human Echolocation. Philosophical Topics 28 (5-6):235-46.
Georges Rey (1995). Toward a Projectivist Account of Conscious Experience. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Liam P. Dempsey (2004). Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
Fred Dretske (1995). Are Experiences Conscious? In Fred Dretske (ed.), Naturalizing the Mind. Mit Press.
L. Dempsey (2004). Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Gaps, One Solution. Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-246.
Gregory M. Nixon (2010). From Panexperientialism to Conscious Experience: The Continuum of Experience. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 (3):216-233.
Michael Pelczar (2008). On an Argument for Functional Invariance. Minds and Machines 18 (3).
Peter Carruthers (2006). Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
Peter Carruthers (1989). Brute Experience. Journal of Philosophy 86 (May):258-269.
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