Realism, Convergence, and Additivity

Abstract
In this paper, we argue for the centrality of countable additivity to realist claims about the convergence of science to the truth. In particular, we show how classical sceptical arguments can be revived when countable additivity is dropped
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 9,357
External links
  • Through your library Configure
    References found in this work BETA

    No references found.

    Citations of this work BETA

    No citations found.

    Similar books and articles
    J. Williamson (1999). Countable Additivity and Subjective Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (3):401-416.
    Colin Howson (2008). De Finetti, Countable Additivity, Consistency and Coherence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (1):1-23.
    Paul Bartha (2004). Countable Additivity and the de Finetti Lottery. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):301-321.
    Sahotra Sarkar (1994). The Selection of Alleles and the Additivity of Variance. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:3 - 12.
    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    1 ( #306,128 of 1,088,428 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    1 ( #69,601 of 1,088,428 )

    How can I increase my downloads?

    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.