Introduction: The Heat of Mild Cognitive Impairment

Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 13 (1):1-2 (2006)
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In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction:The Heat of Mild Cognitive ImpairmentJulian C. Hughes (bio)Keywordsaging, explanation, mild cognitive impairment, understanding, valuesDebates about mild cognitive impairment (MCI) are generating heat, albeit civilized heat. But under the surface, as I think the papers in this special issue demonstrate, the civilized heat comes from a good deal of passion. One way in which philosophy can contribute to the debate is by making plain the sources of this passion, so that the motivating forces are clearer.One motivating force is this: There will be people who do not have dementia but who have symptoms or signs that might predict dementia, which cause them concern, whom we might help by early intervention. The intervention might involve advice and support, or it might involve some form of drug treatment; and in the utopia of our dreams, it might involve prevention. All of this is very motivating for clinical scientists. It also offers a laudable motivation to pharmaceutical companies, who simultaneously must have regard to the possibility of profits for their shareholders.Here, however, is an alternative motivation: The effects of aging must not be ignored if help can be given, but older people must not be stigmatized by a medical process that thrusts disabling labels on them. People age, but they age differently, and it is better to recognize difference, both from a biological and from a philosophical perspective. Thus, a passionate commitment to the cause of individual agency in old age and a desire for authentic autonomy for older people provide strong motivation too.At root, then, the conflicting passions over MCI reflect the age-old struggle in the philosophy of psychiatry between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the human or cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften): the tension is between a tendency to approach the problem with the aim of eliciting a scientific explanation and a tendency to try to achieve a human and cultural understanding of the phenomena (Phillips 2004). So, although MCI can be regarded as an explanatory diagnostic entity with some predictive value, it can also be regarded as a label that might cause harm or as a human phenomenon that requires understanding. Furthermore, MCI raises ontological questions about the nature of disease entities. And there is a wider issue as well about how aging itself should be regarded.From a biological perspective, it turns out there is no clear cutoff between what is normal and what [End Page 1] is not. Hence, in a number of ways, values seem to be as important as facts (Sadler 2005). Perhaps philosophy should content itself with saying no more than this: MCI ought not to be considered or debated as if it lies outside the realm of evaluative judgment. The very possibility of its existence as a clinical entity is a matter worthy of moral and social discourse.The direction of thought indicated here and in the papers that follow, however, is more radical than the easily won point that the "diagnosis" of MCI is not value free. On the back of the biological point, that there is a continuum between physiological and pathological aging, is the broader philosophical point that aging can neither be understood solely in terms of physiology nor in terms of pathology, nor even in terms of both. Ageing represents, inter alia, a social and cultural phenomenon manifest in the context of particular psychological and spiritual responses to a mixture of physiological adaptations and pathological predispositions. Without the broader picture, we tend to characterize old age, as Michael Bavidge has suggested elsewhere, in terms of deteriorations: "We should think of old age as offering alternative rather than impaired ways of experiencing life" (2006, 49). The difficulty is that any diagnosis seems to suggest impairment in one form or another. The radical suggestion, therefore, might be to commend descriptions that encourage shared understanding over and above the giving of names and labels.In a brief critique of the scientific approach to "banal memory disorders and MCI", Jean-Marie Léger, like Bavidge, regrets the extent to which people with cognitive impairment "are described in terms of what they have lost, with no regard for the wealth of faculties which are still present." Léger...

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