David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131 (2010)
Stanley and Williamson (The Journal of Philosophy 98(8), 411–444 2001 ) reject the fundamental distinction between what Ryle once called ‘knowing-how’ and ‘knowing-that’. They claim that knowledge-how is just a species of knowledge-that, i.e. propositional knowledge, and try to establish their claim relying on the standard semantic analysis of ‘knowing-how’ sentences. We will undermine their strategy by arguing that ‘knowing-how’ phrases are under-determined such that there is not only one semantic analysis and by critically discussing and refuting the positive account of knowing-how they offer. Furthermore, we argue for an extension of the classical ‘knowing-how’/‘knowing-that’-dichotomy by presenting a new threefold framework: Using some core-examples of the recent debate, we will show that we can analyze knowledge situations that are not captured by the Rylean dichotomy and argue that, therefore, the latter has to be displaced by a more fine-grained theory of knowledge-formats. We will distinguish three different formats of knowledge we can have of our actions, namely (1) propositional, (2) practical, and (3) image-like formats of knowledge. Furthermore, we will briefly analyze the underlying representations of each of these knowledge-formats.
|Keywords||Knowing how Ability Propositional knowledge Ryle Mental representations|
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References found in this work BETA
John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (2007). Know-How and Concept Possession. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Zoltán Dienes & Josef Perner (1999). A Theory of Implicit and Explicit Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):735-808.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
John Hartland-Swann (1958). An Analysis of Knowing. London, Allen & Unwin.
Citations of this work BETA
Cheng-Hung Tsai (2011). The Metaepistemology of Knowing-How. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):541-556.
Gottfried Vosgerau (2010). Memory and Content. Consciousness and Cognition 19 (3):838-846.
L. C. De Bruin & Albert Newen (2012). An Association Account of False Belief Understanding. Cognition 123 (2):240-259.
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