II. Reply to Skjei∗
Inquiry 28 (1-4):105-113 (1985)
| Abstract | Erling Skjei's criticisms (Inquiry 28, this issue) of my account of communicative action in The Theory of Communicative Action are based on a misunderstanding of the role of the analysis of speech acts in that work. I begin by restating the terms of my analysis, and after dealing with Skjei's objections to my claims for the explanatory power of illocutionary acts, draw attention to a problem with imperatives that I haven't yet done justice to | |||||||||
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