The semantics of rigid designation

Ratio 16 (1):33–48 (2003)
Abstract
Frege's thesis that each singular term has a sense that determines its reference and serves as its cognitive value has come to be widely doubted. Saul Kripke argued that since names are rigid designators, their referents are not determined by senses. David Kaplan has argued that the rigid designation of indexical terms entails that they also lack referent–determining senses. Kripke's argument about names and Kaplan's argument about indexical terms differ, but each contains a false premise. The referents of both names and indexical terms are determined by reflexive senses. It is reflexive sense that makes these terms rigid designators
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References found in this work BETA
John Justice (2001). On Sense and Reflexivity. Journal of Philosophy 98 (7):351-364.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Justice (2007). Unified Semantics of Singular Terms. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):363–373.
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