Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):193-197 (2004)
|Abstract||The paper discusses Crane’s analysis of Knowledge argument, and sets forth author’s disagreement with Crane. Surely Mary learns something new when she sees a color for the first time. The time for a physicalist to quarrel comes only when a qualia person says that this experience represents special phenomenal facts, and that such understanding should be identified with propositional knowledge. We should not confuse ‘having information’ with having the same information in the form of knowledge or belief. Mary knows everything there is to know about color vision. The only thing she has not done is practically experience what it is like to see a color. Thus her knowledge gap is practical and not propositional|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Howard M. Robinson (1993). Dennett on the Knowledge Argument. Analysis 53 (3):174-7.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Martina Fürst (2004). Qualia and Phenomenal Concepts as Basis of the Knowledge Argument. Acta Analytica 19 (32):143-152.
J. M. Musacchio (2002). Dissolving the Explanatory Gap: Neurobiological Differences Between Phenomenal and Propositional Knowledge. [REVIEW] Brain and Mind 3 (3):331-365.
Torin Alter (web). Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience. In E. Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. Mit Press.
Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Dunja Jutronic (2004). The Knowledge Argument--Some Comments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):193-197.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
Gabriel Rabin (2011). Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
Paul Raymont (1999). The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):113-26.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads2 ( #245,680 of 722,765 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,765 )
How can I increase my downloads?