David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minds and Machines 21 (1):41-56 (2011)
It has been argued that prototypes cannot compose, and that for this reason concepts cannot be prototypes (Osherson and Smith in Cognition 9:35–58, 1981; Fodor and Lepore in Cognition 58:253–270, 1996; Connolly et al. in Cognition 103:1–22, 2007). In this paper I examine the intensional and extensional approaches to prototype compositionality, arguing that neither succeeds in their present formulations. I then propose a hybrid extensional theory of prototype compositionality, according to which the extension of a complex concept is determined as a function of what triggers its constituent prototypes. I argue that the theory escapes the problems traditionally raised against extensional theories of compositionality
|Keywords||Prototypes Compositionality Extensional compositionality Intensional compositionality|
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1998). Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong. Oxford University Press.
Gregory L. Murphy (2004). The Big Book of Concepts. The MIT Press.
Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (1981). On the Adequacy of Prototype Theory as a Theory of Concepts. Cognition 9 (1):35-58.
Jussi Jylkkä (2008). Theories of Natural Kind Term Reference and Empirical Psychology. Philosophical Studies 139 (2):153-169.
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